For example, The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB)

For example, The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB) has a specific report aimed solely at businesses. Here economic benefits (and costs) resulting from biodiversity could be highlighted, for example by emphasising that responsible practice is a competitive advantage, or by ML323 chemical structure stressing synergies for example between biodiversity conservation and tourism. Thirdly, the discussions about

science following policy ‘demand’ could be extended to consider knowledge demand by the private sector. This is everyday practice in, for example, technical Quisinostat clinical trial engineering projects. There is no reason why biodiversity research should not be influenced by the knowledge demand from economic actors and other private actors. One example selleck of how private sector actors or high level policy makers (also hard to reach, but relevant for biodiversity) could be reached would be to arrange job-shadowing of these actors by scientists or translators who could then better understand the decision-making

realities these actors are facing and as a result be able to better tailor the knowledge for specific purposes. Furthermore, this would provide opportunities for scientists to prove the usability of their knowledge in the everyday decision-making contexts faced by policy-makers and private actors. One last final challenge is how to increase the salience of research and engagement for policy and other target audiences. Recommendations often emphasise the need for scientists to act differently in order to promote dialogue, but dialogue requires a two-way interest and commitment. Co-production entails that knowledge is produced via iterative two-way interactions between Lepirudin science and policy. Opportunities to promote such interaction between scientists and policy, from

an early stage in any process, will help to create a sense of interest and commitment in all actors engaged (Lövbrand 2011). Results of this interaction would be joint problem definitions, enabling the production of knowledge perceived as politically relevant yet also scientifically interesting. Research funders can promote this by requiring dissemination not only at the end of projects but discussion about problems at the beginning of the projects and/or when designing research programmes. Thus, emphasis would shift from dissemination of results towards continuous engagement as stressed by our previous observations about co-framing. We earlier identified that policy makers’ lack of transparency regarding the way they make decisions can be a serious barrier to interaction. If scientists do not understand the realities of decision-making they will be unlikely to produce relevant and suitable knowledge fit for purpose. Therefore, there is a need for incentives for policy-makers to communicate their processes and priorities to scientists.

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